In a series of recent papers, the prominent Austrian economist Peter Boettke has criticised orthodox economics for its lack of realism. This paper situates Boettke's critique in the context provided by recent developments in the methodology of economics, most notably critical realism. While there is a good deal of common ground between Boettke's approach and critical realism, the latter also helps to reveal some of the limitations of the variant of Austrian economics to which Boettke subscribes. Suggestions are made as to how critical realists and Austrians such as Boettke might move forward together in developing a more realistic, relevant and fruitful approach to economic analysis.
Introduction
'No reality, please. We're economists!' This phrase, taken from a recent edition of the education supplement of The Times newspaper, encapsulates a widely held belief that modern academic economics has become increasingly detached from the real world. 1 The discipline of economics, so its detractors maintain, is dominated by exercises in formal modelling that are designed more to showcase the technical virtuosity of economists than to illuminate pressing economic problems.
A variant of this line of argument has recently been developed in a number of papers written by the prominent Austrian economist Peter Boettke. 2 At the heart of Boettke's critique lies the claim that the tools utilised by orthodox economists-notably formal mathematical modelling-are unsuitable for the analysis of the socio-economic world. For Boettke, the language of mathematics constitutes a Procrustean bed that is unable to do justice to many of the essential features of socio-economic reality, the consequence of which is that formal mathematical models are so far divorced from the realities of socio-economic life that they unable to address, let alone provide answers to, many of the questions that have traditionally been regarded as central to economics. Only if economists tailor their methods more closely to the nature of their subject-matter-in particular by displaying a greater willingness to express their theories discursively, in natural language, as opposed to the mathematical language of formal modelling-will the realities of economic life be re-engaged and the discipline be in a position once again to make significant progress.
Boettke's work has provoked a vigorous response from defenders of orthodox economics. 3 The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate initiated by Boettke by situating it within the context provided by recent developments in the methodology of economics. Economic methodologists, having previously focused almost exclusively upon the epistemological issues involved in the development and appraisal of economic theories, have in the past decade or so begun to devote considerable attention to the ontological commitments of those theories, that is, to what they presuppose about the nature of the socio-economic world. In the vanguard of this 'ontological turn' in the methodology of economics is an approach known as critical realism. This approach, which has received its fullest statement to date in Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality (1997) , claims that a prerequisite for fruitful social scientific research is a set of analytical tools that are tailored to suit the nature of the socio-economic material under investigation. Like Boettke, then, critical realists believe that if economics is to be successful, it requires 'an anchor in the real world' (Boettke 1996:34) . To this end, critical realists use philosophical arguments to develop an abstract picture of the nature of the socio-economic world, which is then used to inform an account of the methods appropriate for studying socio-economic life. This line of reasoning leads critical realists to concur with Boettke that the methods employed by mainstream economists enjoy a distinctly limited applicability in the socio-economic world.
The objective of this paper is to show that there is a good deal of common ground between Austrians and critical realists, and that as a result there exists considerable scope for a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas between proponents of the two approaches. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out Boettke's critique of orthodox economics, after which (in Section 3) his preferred approach to economic analysis is outlined. Critical realism introduced in Section 4 of the paper. While the fourth section of the paper emphasises the commonalities between critical realism and the version of Austrian economics espoused by Boettke, Section 5 draws attention to what from a critical realist vantage point appears to be a potentially important limitation of Boettke's position, before going on to suggest how critical realism can help to overcome it. The final section of the paper summarises the argument and suggests how the critical realism and Austrianism might move forward together in an attempt to develop a more realistic, relevant and fruitful approach to economic analysis.
Boettke on Modern Economics and the Flight from Reality
Central to Boettke's critique of orthodox economics lies the claim that the analytical apparatus employed by orthodox economists for the production of knowledge about the socioeconomic world-notably, formal mathematical modelling-is in fact singularly ill-suited to its allotted task:
'My hypothesis is that economics made a fateful choice in the 1930s and 1940s and chose an intellectual developmental path which has generated a bifurcation in economic thinking between theoretical systems and the real world those systems are supposed to represent, a bifurcation not easily repaired. Formalistic precision was (and is) followed, and the cost was
